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The “Great Meme War:” the Alt-
Right and its Multifarious Enemies
Maxime Dafaure
 
Memes and the metapolitics of the alt-right
1 The alt-right has been a major actor of the online culture wars of the past few years.
Since it  came to prominence during the 2014 Gamergate controversy,1 this  loosely-
defined, puzzling movement has achieved mainstream recognition and has been the
subject  of  discussion  by  journalists  and  scholars  alike.  Although  the  movement  is
notoriously  difficult  to  define,  a  few  overarching  themes  can  be  delineated:
unequivocal rejections of immigration and multiculturalism among most, if not all, alt-
right subgroups; an intense criticism of feminism, in particular within the manosphere
community,  which  itself  is  divided  into  several  clans  with  different  goals  and
subcultures (men’s rights activists, Men Going Their Own Way, pick-up artists, incels).2
Demographically  speaking,  an  overwhelming  majority  of  alt-righters  are  white
heterosexual  males,  one  of  the  major  social  categories  who  feel  dispossessed  and
resentful, as pointed out as early as in the mid-20th century by Daniel Bell, and more
recently by Michael Kimmel (Angry White Men 2013) and Dick Howard (Les Ombres de
l’Amérique 2017). But one of the defining features of the larger alt-right3 is its overall
self-appointment as defender of a declining western civilization.
2 As argued by Niko Heikkilä, “through the Trump campaign, there was an opportunity
to inject alt-right ideas into mainstream U.S. politics by means of visual and rhetorical
provocations.” Such visual  and rhetorical  provocations overwhelmingly consisted of
memes, a concept which needs some clarification before being used for my analysis of
the correlations and resonances between the discourses of the 45th American president,
some of his most extreme supporters, and mainstream conservative media. The meme,
as coined by Richard Dawkins in 1976 in The Selfish  Gene, was defined as “a unit  of
cultural transmission,” and one of its prominent features is that it is viral, almost in an
organic sense: like a virus, it spreads from host to host (here, human minds), but also
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conveys an idea which is designed to alter the host’s worldview. Such a notion can be
traced back to William Burrough’s concept of “language as a virus” which infects their
hosts and consequently creates their realities. It is in this sense that we can understand
Milner and Phillips’ assertion that 2016 was the meme election: 
Trump tapped into prejudices bigger and older than the internet:  hateful  racial
stereotypes,  oppressive  gender  norms,  sweeping  anti-elitism,  and  good  old
fashioned fear of the other.  By tugging at these strings,  Trump ran a campaign
whose platform consisted not of policy proposals or thoughtful argumentation, but
almost entirely of memes […] Online or off, memes emerge when resonant ideas
spread within and across social collectives. Factual, objective truth isn’t a requisite
if underlying idea connects and compels sharing. (Milner & Phillips 2016)
3 The second use of ‘meme’, sometimes referred to as internet memes, consists in “an
amusing or interesting item (such as a captioned picture or video) or genre of items
that  is  spread  widely  online  especially  through  social  media.”  (Merriam-Webster)
Internet memes, also framed as “postmodern folklore,” (Shifman 2013: 15) thus refer to
the actual pictures or words used to express a concept. In The World Made Meme, Ryan
Milner notably explained how this new, digital lingua franca has influenced and shaped
public conversation and discourse, and will most likely continue to do so in the years to
come.
4 The significance and influence of memes (and more broadly internet culture) on the
2016  presidential  campaign,  dubbed  “The  Great  Meme  War”  by  online  pro-Trump
supporters on alt-right hubs such as 4chan’s /pol/ or Reddit’s r/The_Donald, is also to
be linked to the notion of metapolitics, notably used by key alt-right figure Richard
Spencer.  Heavily  inspired  by  Antonio  Gramsci’s  theory  of  cultural  hegemony,  and
borrowed from the French Nouvelle Droite, the concept of metapolitics aims at spreading
certain  themes  and  ideas  among  the  general  public  by  focusing  on  cultural  and
ideological issues rather than on actual politics. It has been mentioned several times by
Spencer as a fundamental notion for the movement he contributed to create. This goal
is also explicitly expressed as “shifting the Overton window.” Another favorite notion
of the movement, the Overton window conceptualizes the opinions which are socially
acceptable  to  hold,  and how this  acceptability  can shift  according to  the dominant
discourses within the public sphere. This essay thus not only examines the creation and
reappropriation of enemy images by the alt-right, in parallel with more conventional
media and public figures, but it also intends to deconstruct the metapolitics behind the
movement’s  cunning  use of  memes,  and the  ways  in  which  the  creation  of  enemy
images fits into this strategy.
 
The foreign civilizational enemy
5 In her 2017 work No Is Not Enough, author and activist Naomi Klein describes one of the
major pillars of Donald Trump’s policies as “a civilizational war against immigrants and
‘radical Islamic terrorism.’”(Klein 2017: 6) Such sentiments were explicitly expressed by
the Republican candidate  during his  2016 campaign,  notably  when he promised he
would  enforce  his  now  infamous  travel  ban,  which  also  came  to  be  known  as  the
Muslim ban. Similarly, in his 2017 speech in Warsaw, the American president presented
his  vision  of  “the  West,”  a  civilization  under  the  threat  of,  and  engaged  in  a  war
against,  Islamic  terrorism.  As  mentioned  earlier,  the  alt-right  often  presents  itself
similarly as a defender of a threatened western civilization and culture, and Donald
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Trump’s  Warsaw  speech  was  soon  identified  as  dog-whistles  to  his  more  extreme
supporters  (Caperhart  2017).  In  this  section,  I  will  discuss  how  the  alt-right  uses
existing  historical  stereotypes  and  recurring  myths  on  immigration,  which  David
Neiwert explains (2017: 78-9), are widespread in conservative circles, and have been so
for decades. Through semantic and critical analysis, I will analyze how such myths are
used to create images of a civilizational outsider enemy.
6 The  first  meme  I  want  to  examine  here  is  that  of  the  “rapefugee.”  This  easy
portmanteau word, which straightforwardly creates an association between refugees
(believed to be almost exclusively Muslim) and sexual violence, became widely used
online from 2016 on, when the European refugee crisis began to unfold. Although it
gained fame on the Anglophone internet, the meme seems to have first appeared in
Germany, following the infamous New Year’s Eve sexual assaults which took place in
several  German  towns.  At  its  inception  was  a  subversion  of  the  phrase  “Refugees
Welcome,”  which  was  both  a  popular  slogan  among  progressive,  pro-refugee
demonstrators,  and the name of  a project  launched in 2014 in Germany and which
became international in the following years. During protests against the arrival of new
refugees, members of the anti-Islam movement PEGIDA, and in particular its founder,
Lutz  Bachmann,  were  seen  wearing  shirts  or  carrying  placards  with  the  words
“Rapefugees Not Welcome, Stay Away!” The visual elements were a subversion of the
original picture associated with the slogan ‘Refugees Welcome’. Here, the fleeing family
is  replaced  by  threatening  and armed men running after  a  woman,  a  scene  which
appeals  to the historical  stereotype of  the foreigner’s  ferocious lust  (Illustration 1).
Such historical stereotypes were spread through racially discriminatory discourses in
the media coverage of those stories, as demonstrated by Monica Ibrahim (2017: 29),
who  showed  that  the  process  of  othering  is  here  twofold,  racial  but  also  cultural.
Furthermore, she analyzed the way the media articulated “the sex attacks in Cologne
with the mass assaults that took place in Egypt years ago to convey an ideological bias,
branding ‘culture of mass sexual harassment’ as a Middle Eastern phenomenon that
would spread into Europe through migration.” (Ibrahim 2017: 30) 
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Figure 1. Rapefugees Not Welcome
Source: https://encyclopediadramatica.rs/File:Rapefugees_Not_Welcome.png
7 A similar type of articulation is at work with the claim that Sweden is the “rape capital”
of Europe due to the arrival of Muslim refugees. This claim, now common among many
anti-immigration right-wingers, was originally made by conservative filmmaker Ami
Horowitz, on Tucker Carlson’s show on Fox News. However, more remarkable than this
myth was its evocation, although indirect and rather awkward, in a speech by President
Trump on  the  day  after  the  interview aired.4 Days  later,  UKIP  leader  Nigel  Farage
jumped on the bandwagon and twitted about Malmö, “the rape capital of Europe due to
EU  migrant  policies.”  Such  unfounded  claims  kindle  historical  sexual  fears  and
fantasies about the other. Muslim men are thus seen as “overly masculine” and are
“associated with a sexuality that goes unchecked,” creating a threatening stereotype
and a justification for stricter immigration laws (Døving 2010).
8 A second meme which demands attention is the crusade-themed meme. In addition to
the racist and bellicose implications of the historical crusades, this meme is tied to and
influenced by gaming culture, another important influence on the metapolitics of the
alt-right (the movement’s emergence was tightly linked to the Gamergate controversy
which I will discuss in the next section). Recurring motives such as the trebuchet, or
the exclamation “Deus Vult” (“God wills it” in Latin), are typical of videogames set in
medieval  times.  However,  “Deus  Vult”  was  readily  co-opted  by  online  far-right
movements, and by some Trump supporters during the 2016 election on websites such
as Reddit or 4chan where the borders between irony and earnestness are precarious.
Several journalistic outlets defined the phrase as an alt-right or white nationalist dog-
whistle, and went on to accuse certain videogames using the term for promotion of
playing into the hands of neo-crusaders (Allegra 2017; Murdock 2018). It is however
important to note that a number of users most likely employed crusade-themed memes
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such as “Time for new crusade” or “Deus Vult” ironically, in the same way that ironic
Nazism has become a trend in recent years, often less as a plea in favor of the Third
Reich than as a gratuitous and deliberately bad taste provocation. The phrase “Urban II
[the pope who launched the First Crusade] did nothing wrong” is thus an alteration of
the  more  common  “Hitler  did  nothing  wrong,”  and  relies  on  the  same  ironic
detachment, typical of internet-based humor (Philips 2015). Nonetheless, even if one
accepts the premise that not all users of those memes are sincere, given the multiple
layers of irony that have become part of many internet cultures, the real-life references
to those themes or phrases make the underlying motivations clear: in 2016, several
mosques were vandalized and sprayed with “Deus Vult,” along with other anti-Muslim
slogans. But the most troubling real-life occurrence of an islamophobic internet meme
happened  in  March  2019,  when  terrorist  and  self-proclaimed  “kebab  removalist”
Brenton Tarrant murdered more than fifty Muslims in two New Zealand mosques in
Christchurch. The “Remove Kebab” meme had appeared several years earlier than the
aforementioned memes. Its origins can be found in an obscure music video designed as
a  tribute  to  Radovan Karadžić,  a  war  criminal  of  the  Bosnian  War  found guilty  of
genocide and crimes against humanity because of his role in ordering the systematic
extermination of Bosnian Muslims.5 Due to such origins, which reinforce the already
obvious  anti-Muslim subtext,  and to  the humorously  odd phrasing of  the meme,  it
turned  into  an  ironic  way  of  mentioning  ethnic  cleansing,  until  any  hint  of  irony
disappeared  when  Tarrant  wrote  the  words  on  his  weapons,  and  had  the  original
tribute song playing in the background during the macabre livestream of his atrocities. 
9 “Orcposting” is yet another type of meme attacking immigration, and is a noteworthy
example of the metapolitics advocated by the alt-right in that it successfully blends
ideology (in this instance, racialist anti-immigrant sentiment), humor (typically in a
caustic or sarcastic tone),  and pop culture references.6 Originally a Twitter hashtag,
orcposting consists in assimilating Muslim refugees with Orcs,  the race created and
used as cannon fodder by Sauron, the archenemy of the free people in Tolkien’s Lord of
the Rings. It is important to note that in the lore of both the books and their movie
adaptations,  Orcs are a race for which there is no redemption possible,  as they are
intrinsically  barbaric  and  evil.  Therefore,  not  only  does  this  assimilation  explicitly
dehumanize  Muslim  immigrants  or  refugees  by  essentializing  them  as  inherently
unable to adapt, or to become “civilized,” but it also raises the theme of invasion, as
displayed in this tweet by evolutionary psychologist Geoffrey Miller, in which Uruk-
Hais  (a  different  type  of  Orcs  but  which embody the  same antagonistic  figure)  are
climbing the walls of a citadel in order to conquer and most likely sack it (Illustration
2). The practice of orcposting thus seems to epitomize the process of othering which
Edward  Saïd  describes  in  Orientalism as  “disregarding,  essentializing,  denuding  the
humanity of another culture, people or geographical region.” (Saïd 1978: 108)
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Figure 2. Tweet by Geoffrey Miller (May 29, 2017) 
Source: https://twitter.com/primalpoly/status/869315252495712257
10 Another favorite target of the alt-right and of Donald Trump are people from South and
Central America. In addition to traditional stereotypes such as that of the lazy Mexican,
the American president famously connected immigration coming from south of the US
border to crime, drugs, and again, sexual violence. His comments about “bad hombres”
during the third presidential debate raised many eyebrows but were consistent with his
major campaign promise to build a wall at the border between the United States and
Mexico. “Build the wall” has become a slogan and rallying cry for Trump supporters.
Again, as Milner and Philips explain, the American president successfully exploited a
meme which resonated among his followers, in a very similar fashion to how slogans
were built and used in former presidential campaigns as “persuasive, short, compelling
tools,” in the words of political scientist Lynn Vavreck (qtd in Chmielewski 2016).
11 Along the same lines, in the weeks leading to the 2018 midterm elections, conservative
media and personalities focused heavily on a migrant caravan coming from Central
American  countries.  The  claims  made  about  this  caravan,  and  the  words  used  to
describe  it  were  explicitly  designed  to  provoke  fear  and  to  encourage  voting  for
representatives  supporting  Trump’s  anti-immigration  policies.  On  October  22,  the
president notably posted a tweet which claimed that “criminals and unknown Middle
Easterners  are  mixed in.”  A  similar  story  could  be  heard on alt-right  outlets,  with
references  to  “alleged  Hondurans,”  “invasion  auxiliary  forces,”  or  a  “coordinated
invasion force overwhelmingly comprised of fighting-age young men.” (Stelter 2018;
Rupar 2018) Likewise, conservative media and pundits raised the threat of an organized
invasion,  some  of  them  even  flirting  with  the  conspiracy  theories  which  inspired
Robert Bowers, the terrorist who murdered 11 Jewish people in a Pittsburgh synagogue
on  October  27,  2018.  As  pointed  out  by  Aaron  Rupar  (2018),  “the  gunman,  Robert
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Bowers, repeatedly referred to people traveling with the caravan as ‘invaders’ on Gab, a
social  media  website  that  serves  as  a  den for  white  supremacists.”  The  recurrence
among mainstream conservative politicians and media, in particular on Fox News, of
similar  wording  about  invasion  or  invaders  in  reference  to  the  Central  American
caravan did not go unnoticed, nor did the “interesting coincidence” that the use of
such  terminology  and  rhetoric  dramatically  dropped  on  the  most  important
conservative channel of the country immediately after the midterm elections (Rupar
2018).  Here  is  another  clear  point  of  convergence  and  resonance  between  obscure
racialist talking points inherited from traditional white supremacist movements and
mainstream contemporary conservatism.
12 By claiming that the religion of Islam is a civilizational threat to the West, this brand of
alt-right  memes  allows  supporters  to  deny  that  race  is  a  crucial  aspect  of  their
islamophobia,  instead  arguing  that  their  opposition  to  Islam  has  philosophical  or
political motives. However, the racial aspects of this first enemy image become explicit
when one considers alt-right treatment of Latin American people. Contrary to Arab-
speaking  Muslims,  a  large  majority  of  people  in  Latin  American  countries  speak  a
European language and are overwhelmingly Christians; yet, they are still presented as a
civilizational  threat.  The paradox can be explained if  their  perceived threat  simply
results from the color of their skin, rather than from cultural or civilizational concerns.
13 At this point,  and to strengthen my argument,  it  is  important to keep in mind the
ideological mindset behind the creation and spread of those memes, which becomes
clearer  when  one  looks  at  the  philosophical  and  ideological  foundations  of  the
“highbrow” alt-right, as George Hawley has put it: politically speaking, the most direct
ancestor of the alt-right is the 1990s paleoconservative movement formed in opposition
to the dominant neoconservatism. Neoconservatives were mostly criticized for their
interventionism and laissez-faire economic policies, whereas paleoconservatives were
deeply isolationist and protectionist, with a strong focus on economic nationalism and
cultural traditionalism. Paul Gottfried, an influential thinker of paleoconservatism, was
also instrumental in the early development of the alt-right, as he was the mentor of
Richard  Spencer,  and  he  is  rumored  to  have  coined  the  “alternative  right”  label,
although Spencer disputes this claim (Hawley 2017: 32).  Gottfried and Spencer have
taken their distances following political and strategical divergences in the wake of the
Trump campaign, notably after Gottfried’s disdain for white nationalism. Interestingly,
the first signs of disagreement between the alt-right and the Trump administration
appeared in April 2017, when the American president ordered airstrikes against Syria
despite  having  adopted  a  non-interventionist  stance  during  his  campaign;  such
tensions, sometimes expressed by vehement rejections of former alt-right champion
Trump, highlights the isolationist legacy of paleoconservatism on the alt-right, as does
both movements’ contempt for traditional conservatism.
14 Another major influence of the alt-right is the neo-reactionary movement known as the
Dark  Enlightenment  spearheaded by  Nick  Land and Curtis  Yarvin.  As  its  nickname
suggests,  this school of  thought which emerged in the late 2000s rejects the values
inherited  from  the  Enlightenment  and  is  thus  at  heart  anti-egalitarian  and  anti-
democratic,  with strong authoritarian instincts,  and is often considered as a radical
extension of  American libertarianism. Neo-reaction however remains a  little-known
ideology, consisting more in a philosophical movement than a political one, contrary to
the inherently political alt-right, which strives to present itself as a populist and anti-
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elitist mass movement, in addition to a cultural phenomenon — although, as argued by
Hawley  (2018),  and  as  demonstrated  by  the  failure  of  almost  all  their  offline
happenings, the alt-right found it almost impossible to present itself in real life as the
fun  counterculture  it  appeared  to  be  online.  Neo-reaction  is  also  noted  for  its
misanthropy, a common feature among several internet subcultural spaces, as well as
for  its  civilizational  pessimism  and  occasional  focus  on  the  same  pseudoscientific
theories exploited by the alt-right: this “scientific racism” is notably expressed through
an abundant use of  euphemistic  catchphrases such as  race realism or HBD (human
biodiversity, a racialist exaggeration of the importance of genetic differences between
human  populations),  and  serves  as  a  justification  for  the  Dark  Enlightenment’s
extremely elitist worldview as much as for the alt-right’s equally extreme racist ethos.
Given such anti-egalitarian, anti-democratic and often racialist ideological origins, it
does  not  come  as  a  surprise  that  the  contemporary  promoters  of  progressive  and
liberal values inherited from the Enlightenment are treated as formal enemies of the
alt-right, as will be examined in the following section.
 
Online culture wars and ideological antagonists
15 Racial  subtexts  transpire in some of  the vocabulary alt-righters  use to  deride their
ideological opponents. One of the most significant examples is the slur “cuckservative.”
It is another portmanteau buzzword between the words cuckold and conservative, used
to mock usually moderate conservative who support some liberal policies, in particular
those who are not in favor of strong immigration laws. It is also one of the earliest alt-
right  memes  to  reach  a  mainstream  audience,  as  demonstrated  by  the  significant
number of newspapers and websites which mentioned it through the summer of 2015,
during the campaign for the Republican presidential nomination. Although it is similar
to  “RINO”  (Republican  In  Name  Only)  or  other  slurs  for  “fake  conservatives,”  the
“cuckservative” meme’s origins shed light on the meanings intended by its creators. As
noted by Joseph Bernstein (2015a),  the term first  appeared on alt-right forums and
blogs and refers to a pornographic genre “in which passive white husbands watch their
wives have sex with black men.” Although it could be argued that the term “cuckold” is
sufficiently insulting to add any racial connotation, users on websites affiliated to the
alt-right tend to be knowledgeable about pornographic categories. It seems more than
likely that the reference was deliberate, and in the vein of more explicit terms such as
“race traitor.” Ta-Nehisi Coates (2017) further explains the motivations behind the slur,
analyzing that “the target is so weak that he would submit to the humiliation of having
his white wife lie with black men.” Victims of these slurs include conservatives who
opposed  Donald  Trump,  as  documented  by  David  French  (2016),  a  writer  for  the
conservative magazine National Review who has an adopted African-American daughter,
and who faced a campaign of online abuse and harassment.
16 Niko Keikkilä rightly notes that the “‘cuckservative’  narrative represented the anti-
establishment mood embodied by the alt-right,”  in  that  it  “intertwined subcultural
jargon and ideas  of  masculinity  and  race.”  Maybe  more  significantly,  he  adds  that
“besides  being  an  example  of  popularization  of  alt-right  ideas,  [the  ‘cuckservative’
meme] served as a reminder of increasing online and social media antagonism in the
election.” Such antagonism, although far from novel neither in form nor substance, has
indeed  become  particularly  prevalent  on  social  media  over  the  course  of  the  last
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decade.  In  this  section,  I  want  to  give  particular  attention  to  some  of  the  memes
employed in what Angela Nagle describes as 
the online culture wars that formed the political sensibilities of a generation, […]
the online battles that may otherwise be forgotten but have nevertheless shaped
culture and ideas in a profound way from tiny obscure subcultural beginnings to
mainstream public and political life in recent years. (Nagle 2017: 9)
17 These  online  culture  wars,  the  repercussion  of  the  1980s  and  1990s  culture  wars
dissected by Andrew Hartman in A War for the Soul of America (2015), were marked by
the emergence of new categorizations of antagonistic figures, the most notable of them
probably being that of the Social Justice Warrior (commonly abbreviated to SJW).7 The
Social Justice  Warrior  label,  highly  sarcastic,  refers  to  an  activist  defined  by  their
support  for  progressive  politics,  typically  feminism,  political  correctness,  or
environmentalism, but also by the supposedly aggressive and emotional rhetoric used
to defend these opinions. The SJW qualification can however be very malleable: George
Hawley  (2017:  43-4)  mentions  how Ben  Shapiro,  although  a  staunchly  conservative
pundit  famous  on  the  internet  for  his  attacks  against  progressive  politics  and  his
catchphrase “facts don’t care about your feelings,” was labeled a SJW by people more
right-wing than Shapiro himself.  The images and preconceptions used to create the
SJW stereotype led SJWs (or at least their representation) to be largely loathed among
several online subcultures, even among those not necessarily adhering to the extremist
views of the manosphere or of white nationalists.8
18 The 2014 Gamergate controversy mentioned earlier, described as “the galvanizing issue
that  drew up the battle  lines of  the culture wars for  a  younger online generation”
(Nagle 2017: 24), is a pertinent example of how anti-SJW sentiment created a backlash
against  attempts,  however small  in scale,  to  bring progressive themes into broader
culture, in this instance into gaming culture. In contrast to the Gamergate proponents’
claim that the controversy was about “ethics in gaming journalism,” Mike Wendling
(2018: 65) offers a more convincing approach: “[Gamergate] amplified the lament that
feminism  had  gone  too  far,  that  a  normally  male-dominated  space  was  becoming
feminized,  and  that  ‘social  justice  warriors’  were  taking  over.”  Indeed,  one  of  the
recurring aspects found in pro-Gamergate (and anti-SJW as a whole) arguments is the
perception  that  diversity,  tolerance  and  more  generally  speaking  PC  (politically
correct) politics are being force-fed to the general public. For the anti-SJW crowd, PC
culture has become the embodiment of all the perceived evils of contemporary leftist
thought: authoritarianism, anti-free speech positions (exemplified by online or real-life
policies  of  deplatforming),  and  extreme  sensitivity  to diverging  opinions.  Nicole
Hemmer  (2016)  argues  that  political  correctness  is  “the  alt-right's  most  cherished
concept,” precisely because it allows them to mask their racism, misogyny and anti-
Semitism. In this light,  it  is  interesting to note that one of the online communities
primarily  associated  with  the  emergence  of  the  alt-right  is  4chan’s  /pol/,  the
“politically incorrect” section of the website. 
19 Opposition to PC culture also provides an example of one of the favorite strategies of
the alt-right: the co-optation of rhetorical and conceptual tools from the opposite side
of  the  political  and ideological  spectrum.  Political  scientist  Zeynep Gambetti  (2018)
explains that the strategy is “to appropriate the terms of the liberal politics of identity
and to push identitarian arguments to their logical conclusion.” As a result here, a key
concept of PC culture, namely trigger warnings, was reappropriated and rearranged in
order to both deride it and spread the idea that SJW are overly sensitive.9 This idea
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works  along  the  lines  of  the  “special  snowflake”  designation,  sometimes  used
interchangeably  with  SJW,  and  another  occurrence  of  popular  culture  in  internet
vernacular  (the  phrase  “You  are  not  a  special.  You  are  not  a  beautiful  or  unique
snowflake” comes from the 1999 movie Fight Club, which has become cult among many
young  people  from  radically  different  ideological  backgrounds).  The  “snowflake”
epithet is meant to sarcastically highlight both the sensitivity and the self-centeredness
of the target. In order to further prove the point that progressives are overly sensitive
(and by extension overemotional), alt-righters do not hesitate to push the envelope and
to try to make the most polemical statements imaginable. This strategy was epitomized
in 2016 with an online campaign coined #TheTriggering launched by Canadian alt-right
pundit  Lauren  Southern  (one  of  the  rare  high-profile  women  of  the  movement,
although she  has  repeatedly  rejected the  alt-right  label,  and officially  retired from
political  activism  in  June  2019).  It  consisted  in  tweeting  deliberately  provocative
statements  made to  “trigger” angry responses  from progressives.  This  is  similar  to
trolling tactics explored by Whitney Philips in This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things, and
echoes Douglas Rushkoff’s words (1994: 186) about the tactics used by underground
activists  to  achieve a  form of  visibility:  “Alternative distributors  depend on others,
even the enemy,  to  spread their  memes.”  Indeed,  as  previously  demonstrated with
various  memes,  the  alt-right  manages  to  reach  mainstream  audiences  through
intentionally  outrageous  claims,  via  media  either  circulating  similar  ideas  or,
contrariwise,  vehemently  attacking  them,  which  nonetheless  helps  spread  and
contribute to the “infection” (to use Rushkoff’s terminology) of unsuspecting minds by
reactionary, racialist and supremacist memes. The potency of memes as propaganda
tools is also directly linked to the issue of amplification: such collective storytelling is
indeed ineluctably reinforced and perpetuated even when it is denounced, and thus,
“content spreads memetically whether participants share something to signal support,
disgust, or anything on the spectrum in between.” (Phillips & Milner 2017: 54)
20 I would like to explore here another successful strategy of the alt-right described by
Zeynep Gambetti (2018), who explains that “the Alt-Right obscures power differentials
by putting Whiteness or European descent at the same level as minority identities.”
Power  differentials  are  similarly  obscured  by  recent  alt-right  adversarial  rhetoric,
notably  through  the  use  of  false  equivalences,  in  particular  in  their  attempt  at
reversing the perceptions of their movement and of their ideological enemies by the
public opinion. Thereby, Antifa, the equally vague antifascist movement actively and
sometimes physically opposing far-right demonstrations, is recurrently presented as an
actual fascist movement, in opposition to the free speech extremism of the alt-right.
Likewise, “feminazi” is a beloved anti-feminist portmanteau buzzword promoting the
idea that feminists are authoritarian, angry and man-hating women, a stereotype that
taps into thousands of years of misogyny, as demonstrated by Zuckerberg (2017). Once
again, the popularization of the “feminazi” term came from a mainstream conservative
pundit, Rush Limbaugh, host of the most popular radio talk-show in the United States.
Similarly, when Donald Trump notoriously called Hillary Clinton a “nasty woman” in
October 2016, the phrase became a meme of its own among both Trump and Clinton
supporters. Online, in order to convey the themes carried by the “feminazi” meme,
anti-feminists have  recourse  to  visual  means:  by  cherry-picking  images  of  feminist
women arguing with political opponents, and by capturing through a screenshot the
moment when they appear the most irrational and angry, anonymous internet users at
the inception of those internet memes create powerful enemy images (Illustrations 3
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and 4).  These  images  are  then captioned,  sometimes doctored or  integrated within
other popular internet memes, and spread via various social media to disseminate the
idea that anger, irrationality, hatred of men, and feminism are all linked. Such images
may  thus  come  to  mind  when  Nagle  mentions  “sour-faced  identitarians  who
undoubtedly drove so many young people to the right during these vicious culture
wars” (Nagle 2017: 117). Of course, one must however remain careful, and question the
existence of genuinely authoritarian feminists behind the numerous “radical feminists”
personae on social media which often turn out to be sockpuppet accounts (Hampton
2019),  or  to  the  sometimes  surprisingly  effective  false  flag  campaigns  (Fernando
Alfonso 2014/7), both of which are common warfare and propaganda strategies, in this
case  designed to  undermine the  credibility  of  feminism as  a  whole.  The  alt-right’s
strategical  use  of  memes  can  therefore  be  considered  as  a  form  of  manipulative
ideological cyberwarfare.
 
Figure 3. “Big Red; The Assumption I Hate Men Is Correct.” Know Your Meme, 2014
Source: https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/people/big-red
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Figure 4. “Triggered Feminist/Ficki Fiona; MFW [My Face When] Someone Tells Me There Are Only
Two Genders.” Know Your Meme, 2016
Source: https://knowyourmeme.com/photos/1470831-triggered-feminist--2
21 The  last  internet  meme  I  want  to  discuss  in  this  section  is  the  NPC,  an  acronym
standing for Non-Player Character.10 Originating from 4chan, it also draws on gaming
culture: an NPC is a character present in almost all types of videogames, its behavior
and dialogues being usually predictable since they are determined by a script. In 2018,
NPC began being used by alt-right channers (the users on sites such as 4chan) as a
derogatory and dehumanizing term for liberals, progressives or moderates, and more
broadly for anybody not in line with alt-right talking points. NPCs are characterized as
unable  to  have  ideas  and  thoughts  of  their  own,  readily  compared  to  previous
pejorative  qualifications  such  as  “sheeple”  or  the  more  recent  and  internet-savvy
“normie,” mentioned in the title of Angela Nagle’s 2017 Kill All Normies. The NPC, devoid
of any feelings or critical thinking, is often opposed to the Feels Guy meme, also known
as Wojack, which commonly expresses the sadness or feeling of loneliness of the user
posting  it  (Illustration  5).11 When  employed  by  alt-righters,  the  NPC  tends  to  be
presented as frowning, usually ticked off  by some far-right slogan; one of the most
frequent captions associated with the NPC is “Orange Man Bad,” a dismissive parody of
anti-Trump arguments (Illustration 6).
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Figure 5. “Wojack and NPC.” Know Your Meme, 2018
The exclamation point refers to videogames, in which it is meant to alert the player that an interaction
with the NPC can for example lead to a quest.
Source: https://knowyourmeme.com/photos/1411366-npc-wojak
 
Figure 6. “Orange Man Bad – NPC Rage.” Know Your Meme, 2018 
Source: https://knowyourmeme.com/photos/1419757-orange-man-bad
22 The reappropriation of the NPC meme by the alt-right echoes that of another popular
internet  meme,  Pepe the Frog,  the cartoonish green amphibian which has come to
represent  the movement to  many observers.  I  would argue,  following from Philips’
concept of “oxygen of amplification” (2017) and danah boyd’s “hacking of the attention
economy” (2017), that such reapproprations were made possible by mainstream media,
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even, and in this case, to refine Rushkoff’s idea, in particular by those considered to be
the enemy. Indeed, for alt-righters at the origin of such internet memes, the fact that
their “work” is mentioned beyond the websites where they emerged is a major success
in  itself.  Not  only  does  their  evocation  boost  the  ego  and  sometimes  the  online
reputation of the original posters, but they often sow confusion among conventional
commentators, rarely versed in internet and meme culture. More importantly, such
exposure  subtly  contributes  to  the  spread  of  the  worldviews  behind  those  memes.
Indeed, similarly to the foreigner threatening to invade the country or the SJW trying
to subvert traditional values, the impersonal NPC embodies an archetypical character
within a broader narrative.
 
Cultural Marxism and paranoid narratives
23 All the concepts and notions I have evoked so far are articulated within a large-scale
narrative, widespread among far-right circles under the name of Cultural Marxism. Its
proponents  believe  that  there  has  been a  conspiracy  at  work against  the  capitalist
West,  originating  from  the  Frankfurt  School,  a  group  of  (mostly)  Marxist  social
researchers comprising major figures of the field such as Theodor W. Adorno, Herbet
Marcuse,  or  more recently  Jürgen Habermas,  famous for  developing the concept  of
critical  theory.  It  is  a  well-documented  conspiracy  theory,  notably  discussed  by
political scientist Jérôme Janin (2018) and intellectual historian Martin Jay (2010). Janin
discovered that the Cultural Marxism/Frankfurt School conspiracy theory emerged in
the  context  of  the  1990s  culture  wars  and  of  the  paleoconservative  movement,  in
particular through the writings of Pat Buchanan, Paul Gottfried, and William Lind (one
of the first critics to make the claim that “political correctness is Cultural Marxism”
[Lind 2000]), before spreading among various Western far-right groups. Such origins
underline  the  crucial  influence  of  paleoconservatism  on  the  emergence  and
construction of  the alt-right and of  its  worldview.  Janin also explains how Cultural
Marxism “offers a variable scope,” insofar as it “gives a large range of possible uses by
multiple actors from right-wing conservative intellectuals to criticize Marxism in the
United States to radical and violent groups to denounce the ‘death of the West.’” (Janin
2018)  Martin Jay presents  a  list  of  11  points  allegedly  established by the Frankfurt
School to promote Cultural Marxism, among which “the creation of racism offences,”
“the teaching of sex and homosexuality to children,” “huge immigration to destroy
identity,”  “the  promotion  of  excessive  drinking,”  “emptying  of  churches,”  “an
unreliable  legal  system  with  bias  against  victims  of  crime,”  or  “encouraging  the
breakdown of the family” (Jay 2010). He also explains that verbatim copies of this list
can be found on almost every right-wing outlet taking this conspiracy theory seriously,
and it is not rare to see this list used as propaganda in discussions on Cultural Marxism
on websites such as 4chan or Reddit today. Cultural Marxism thus provides its believers
with a one-size-fits-all  narrative about all  the perceived evils threatening the West,
whether  it  is  immigration,  feminism,  political  correctness,  and  more  broadly  any
challenge to traditional social, gender, or racial norms. This conspiracy theory even
reached the White House through a 2017 National Security Council memo written by
Rich Higgins, then a NSC employee, which presented Donald Trump as “an existential
threat  to  cultural  Marxist  memes  that  dominate  the  prevailing  cultural  narrative.”
(Winter & Groll 2017)
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24 This alleged domination of Cultural Marxist memes on the cultural narrative echoes
another widespread theme of contemporary conservatism, namely the liberal bias in
academia and mainstream media. One can find a thorough history of the manipulation
by conservatives of  this alleged liberal  bias in the academy, and of one of  its  most
symbolic aspects, political correctness, in John Wilson’s 1995 work, The Myth of Political
Correctness:  The Conservative Attack on Higher Education.  Similar accusations have been
made against mainstream media, which have become synonymous of liberal media to
many right-wingers and Republicans, who incidentally ignore the fact that the most
popular media in the United States are conservative (Umstead 2019). Once more, it is in
large part because of such long-held assumptions among large swathes of the public
that Donald Trump and his supporters successfully spread the “fake news” meme, a
powerful  tool  used and abused during the 2016 campaign and later throughout the
Trump presidency (the American president tweeted 114 times about fake news between
January 1, 2019 and July 1, 2019, not to mention in his speeches).12
25 The theme of conspiracy theories is far from novel in American political life, as shown
by Richard Hofstadter’s 1964 seminal essay “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,”
and followed by numerous works, including Timothy Melley’s Empire of Conspiracy: The
Culture of  Paranoia in Postwar America (2000).  There also appears to be a long-lasting
American tradition of othering intertwined with such paranoid mentalities. Historical
examples  include racial  dimensions  (as  in  the previously  discussed stereotypes  and
suspicions about Hispanics, but also about African Americans, recently revived by the
“birther” conspiracy theory targeting Barack Obama), religious ones (with the Know
Nothing movement of the 1850s, which accused Catholic immigrants of plots and evils
very similar to those attributed by contemporary far-right groups to Muslims or Jews
today), as well as ideological ones (with for example the notorious John Birch Society,
whose alarming and antagonistic views on “commies” and socialists have again come in
the  spotlight  in  the  last  decades,  in  particular  during  the  Trump  campaign  and
presidency). However, the advent of the Internet seems to have given a dramatic new
momentum to paranoid mindsets. Indeed, conspiracy theories are thriving online, and
many  on  the  alt-right  are  binging  on  “alternative  facts”  about  society,  politics,  or
history. An example of a recurring conspiracy theory among alt-right communities can
be found in French writer and politician Renaud Camus’ “Grand Remplacement,” which
claims that there is a deliberate replacement of native European populations by non-
Europeans, a very similar theory to Bat Ye’or’s “Eurabia.” Both conspiracy theories fall
under the concept of demographic threat, an obsession of white nationalists which also
expresses  itself  through  the  analogous  “Kalergi  Plan,”  or  the  more  recent  and
widespread “white genocide” theory. Encompassing most previous theories, it was
notably popularized through the slogan “diversity is codeword for white genocide,” a
variation of “anti-racist is code word for anti-white,” a portion of the Mantra, a short
text  famous among online white  supremacists  (Lenz 2017).  Although these theories
have  blatantly  shallow  foundations,  they  spread  in  a  fashion  similar  to  memes;
however, in addition to discretely infecting unsuspecting minds, they also tend to rely
on confirmation bias, and work as gateways to further conspiratorial beliefs. Indeed,
these recurring and often interwoven conspiracy theories obviously and inevitably lead
to the  question of  their  perpetrator(s):  since  all  these  conspiracies  are  deliberately
orchestrated,  a  powerful  and  secret  force  must  necessarily  be  pulling  the  strings,
whether from within as a fifth column, or from above as a secretive global influence.
The “Great Meme War:” the Alt-Right and its Multifarious Enemies
Angles, 10 | 2020
15
26 Unsurprisingly, many among the alt-right believe they are fighting the old nemesis of
many historical far-right movements, the Jew, the usual suspect of a large proportion
of  conspiracy  theories.  The  Cultural  Marxism  narrative  has  particularly  telling
ancestors,  since  it  is  a  mere  contemporary  update  of  Nazi  Germany’s  concept  of
“Cultural Bolshevism” used to foster anti-Soviet fears (not unlike the American anti-
communist  hysterias  of  the  Red  Scares).  Maybe  even  more  telling  is  its  direct
association with the  like-minded “Jewish Bolshevism” concept,  which professes  the
whimsical  claim  that  a  Jewish  cabal  is  responsible  for  the  creation  and  spread  of
communism, and more broadly for the “degeneracy” of traditional Western values, an
infamous term which also surfaces in recent far-right arguments.  The outright and
pervading antisemitism of the alt-right is exemplified by another of their memes which
garnered considerable media coverage, the use of triple brackets, or (((echo))), to signal
the  Jewish  faith  of  the  target  (Anthony  &  Fleishman  2016).  But  the  conspiratorial
antisemitism of the online far-right movements comprising the alt-right is epitomized
by  its  almost  pathological  obsession  with  George  Soros,  the  Hungarian-American
billionaire and long-time supporter of progressive causes. A symbolic bogeyman for the
extreme  right,  he  is  regularly  accused  of  organizing  and/or  funding  anti-Trump
activism  (notably  the  2017  Women’s  March  following  the  inauguration  of  the  new
president),  gun-control protests,  but also of having orchestrated the violence which
took  place  in  Charlottesville,  Virginia,  in  August  2017  during  the  major  real-life
happening of  the alt-right (Sankin 2017).  He was even accused of  being behind the
Central American migrant caravan discussed in the first section, which led him to be
targeted  by  Cesar  Sayoc’s  mail  bombing  campaign  in  October  2018,  among  other
prominent Democratic or liberal American figures. Yet again, it has been noted that the
demonization  of  Soros,  at  first  restricted  to  obscure  far-right  outlets,  turned
mainstream  in  large  part  through  Republican  politicians  and  conservative  pundits
(Vogel et al. 2018).
27 Richard Hofstadter was already emphasizing the effects of mass media on paranoid and
conspiratorial minds in 1964: “the villains of the modern right are much more vivid
than those of their paranoid predecessors, much better known to the public.” More
than fifty years later, and despite, or maybe because of the Internet revolution, this
claim holds true. And furthermore, those villains have retained the same superior and
almost supernatural attributes described by Hofstadter:
This enemy is clearly delineated: he is a perfect model of malice, a kind of amoral
superman-sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual, luxury-loving. Unlike the
rest of us, the enemy is not caught in the toils of the vast mechanism of history,
himself a victim of his past, his desires, his limitations. (Hofstadter 1964)
28 This presentation of an evil mastermind towering above and detached from the rest of
the population seems to  perfectly  fit  the figure embodied by George Soros,  and by
extension by Jews and Cultural Marxists in the alt-right mythology. To further establish
the  link,  Soros  is  often  assimilated  to  historical  evils  (he  is  recurrently  accused  of
having  collaborated  with  the  Nazis  and  of  having  betrayed  fellow  Jews  despite  all
factual  evidence)  or  to  fictional  archfiends,  such  as  Star  Wars’  Darth  Sidious
(Illustration  7),  whose  storyline  resonates  with  the  accusations  against  Soros  (by
pulling the strings in the shadows, Darth Sidious is the actual ruler of the universe).
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Figure 7. “George Soros/Darth Sidious.” SOTT.net.
Source: https://www.sott.net/image/s19/390237/large/george_soros_darth_sidious.jpg
29 As  argued  throughout  this  essay,  the  epitome  of  the  alt-right’s  metapolitics  is  the
combination of long-lasting prejudices, humorously detached sarcasm and irony typical
of the internet atmosphere, and sly use of popular references understandable by most.
By framing their targets as stereotypical villains, the representations of which speak
for  themselves  (the  lustful  and  invading  foreigner,  the  fragile,  irrational,  and
subversive  SJW, or  the  lurking  puppetmaster  secretly  coordinating  civilizational
attacks  on  the  West),  the  metapolitical  strategy  of  the  alt-right  remaps  the
understanding of the world for a sizeable part of the population and creates a unifying
narrative which helps its followers to make sense of a complicated reality. However,
the more or less abstract yet irredeemably evil enemy used as a threatening rhetorical
tool can easily turn into a tangible, real-life enemy.
 
When the fantasized enemy becomes real
30 The possible dangers raised by such paranoid and adversarial worldviews are already
hinted at in Hofstadter’s essay: “since the enemy is thought of as being totally evil and
totally unappeasable, he must be totally eliminated — if not from the world, at least
from  the  theatre  of  operations  to  which  the  paranoid  directs  his  attention.”
(Hofstadter 1964) Although the primary “theatre of operations” of the enemy images
under scrutiny in this study seems to be the very minds and mental representations of
the  general  public  —  a  symbolic  elimination  through  processes  of  othering,  the
elimination imperative of such rhetoric has also produced tragic consequences beyond
the world of ideas. Right-wing terrorism is not a new trend in American history; the
last decade has known a resurgence of ideologically-motivated killings13. In May 2014,
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Elliot Rodger murdered six people in California in one of the first “incel” attacks, thus
bringing the misogynistic movement in the public eye. The 2015 Charleston Church
shooting  is  also  an  early  example  of  the  potency  of  online  radicalization,  as  the
terrorist, Dylann Roof, stated in his manifesto that a simple Google search changed his
entire  worldview and made him “racially  aware,”14 a  change which resulted in  the
slaughter of nine African-American parishioners.  In late 2016,  shots were fired in a
Washington  D.C.  pizzeria  targeted  by  the  notorious  and  bizarre  conspiracy  theory
known as “Pizzagate”, which tied links between the Democratic establishment and the
Clinton family, a child sex ring, and the small local restaurant (Fisher et al. 2016). The
August 2017 Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville must also be mentioned as a car
attack committed by a white supremacist killed a counter-protester and injured several
more. As mentioned earlier, the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue shooter was also heavily
involved in alt-right communities, and was named in the manifesto of the April 2019
Poway synagogue shooter, alongside Brenton Tarrant, who himself quoted Norwegian
terrorist Anders Breivik in his own manifesto, packed with in-jokes and references to
internet  and alt-right  themes (in  addition to  the “Remove Kebab” meme,  Tarrant’s
manifesto, called “The Great Replacement,” notably alludes to Cultural Marxism, as did
Breivik’s manifesto in 2011).  Finally,  a compelling consequence of the alarming and
antagonistic discourses about invading immigrants analyzed in the first section came in
August 2019, when Patrick Crusius murdered 22 people and injured 24 others in an El
Paso supermarket,  specifically targeting Hispanics whom he believed were invading
Texas in order to bring “cultural and ethnic replacement.” Like his predecessors, the El
Paso  shooter  also  expressed  admiration  for  the  Christchurch  shooter  in  his  own
manifesto, once again published online on 8chan shortly before the shooting.
31 As observed, a large majority of these terror attacks involved a manifesto, written and
published online by the terrorists before they committed their heinous crimes. Those
manifestos almost systematically display a sense of urgency, coupled with a perceived
duty to act (Roof notably wrote “no one doing anything but talking on the internet.
Well someone has to have the bravery to take it to the real world, and I guess that has
to  be  me,”  a  sentiment  echoed  in  several  subsequent  manifestos),  glorifications  of
previous terrorists, as well as, more often than not, an explicit call to arms to like-
minded individuals. These elements shed light on another consequence of the use of
enemy  images  within  broader  paranoid  and  Manichean  narratives:  if  western
civilization (or the USA, or the “white race”) is under threat and on the brink of ruin, it
calls  for brave and heroic soldiers willing to fight and possibly to die for a greater
purpose, and offers them an opportunity to become martyrs for their cause, an obvious
yet striking similarity with other extremist movements and narratives, in particular
Islamist ones15. Enemy images also create a form of intersectionality between the fringe
groups that find themselves gathered against common foes under the umbrella term
alt-right:  misogynistic  “incels”  often  blame  feminism,  interracial  relationships,  and
other  “symptoms  of  Cultural  Marxism”  for  their  lack  of  social  and  sexual  success;
conversely, white supremacists co-opted some of the manosphere’s ideas and lexicon,
most notably the concept of “red pill,” another reference to popular culture, here the
1999 movie The Matrix, in which the protagonist taking the red pill gets to see the world
as  it  really  is  (in  the  manosphere,  being  red-pilled  basically  means  realizing  that
feminism is the cause of most ills of modern society; with the alt-right,  it  similarly
means becoming “racially aware”).  This union and cooperation among the different
online communities of the alt-right is however far from steady, and as George Hawley
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underlines, the context of the 2016 presidential election provided a clear set of goals
and obvious common enemies to this movement, which found it very complicated to
reach that level of organization and coordination without such context. The upcoming
2020 presidential election in the United States will therefore require close scrutiny, as
will the relation between the incumbent president and his most extreme supporters.
Indeed, and in opposition to the self-congratulatory reactions of the alt-right following
the election of “their” candidate, I tend to agree with Nicole Hemmer when she says
that “more than the alt-right made Donald Trump, Donald Trump made the alt-right.
He validated many of their points of view, as well as their stylistic approach.” (Jervis
2016)  I  would,  however,  nuance  that  assertion  by  noting  that  reactionary  and
ultraconservative ideologies have prospered in the United States both on and offline
for a long time, and that Trump’s fiery and outrageous rhetoric tapped into what his
advisors felt was the pre-existing dominant mood of anxiety among white Americans
feeling disregarded and dispossessed.
32 In all three cases of this study, the alt-right has been exploiting historical prejudices,
with  a  slight  update  to  the  21st-century  digital  environment.  Their  enemy  images
consist in “culturally influenced, very negative and stereotypical evaluation[s] of the
‘other.’”  (Fiebig-von  Hase  1997)  The  online  and  viral  context  of  their  spread  is
conductive  to  even  greater  alienation,  however,  as  explained  by  Whitney  Philips:
“because content is so easily severed from creator, and because information spreads so
fast  online,  […]  it  is  inevitable  that  real people  would  be  reduced  to  fictionalized
things.” (Philips 2015: 119) As we have seen, such reduction to a fictionalized entity can
lead  to  very  real  threats  for  the  people  (mis)represented  and  caricatured  in  those
memes.  This  examination  also  illustrates  the  potential  clout  of  memes,  which  was
implicitly acknowledged by the Trump administration on July 11, 2019, during a social
media  summit  at  the  White  House,  in  which  prominent  online  supporters  of  the
president were invited to discuss the alleged bias against conservatives on major social
media such as Twitter or Facebook, but also — perhaps even more so, to prepare the
president’s campaign for the 2020 election (Rupar 2019). As demonstrated in this essay,
the  force  and  reach  of  online  enemy  images  can  be  used  to  appeal  to  tech-savvy
teenagers or young adults, but also to middle-aged blue collar workers, who now also
get some, if not most, of their news from social media such as Facebook, news which
can turn into far-fetched conspiracy theories in just one or two clicks on the wrong
sensationalist  clickbait.  The  examples  of  Cesar  Sayoc,  56,  and  Robert  Bowers,  46,
respectively suspect of the mail bombing attempts and perpetrator of the Pittsburgh
synagogue  shooting,  are  eloquent:  they  both  self-radicalized  online,  despite  not
corresponding to the intended alt-right audience. They also reveal two different sides
of  the  movement,  polarized  by  their  stances  on  Donald  Trump (Sayoc  is  a  fervent
supporter of the American president, while Bowers rejects him for being too soft).
33 Eventually,  perhaps  even  more  significant  is  the  relationship  between  subcultural
aggregators such as 4chan and Reddit, and mass media, a relationship which echoes the
“cybernetic feedback loop” in which early trolls  and sensationalist  corporate media
coexisted (Philips 2015). The alt-right’s successful memes invariably follow the same
pattern: they are carefully designed on underground social media, using the codes and
standards in force, before being approved and/or altered by like-minded users, after
which they are disseminated on more conventional social media, typically Twitter or
Facebook. This dissemination is almost always coordinated, which means it is felt as a
great achievement when major mainstream media evoke a particular meme, the same
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feeling of pride which was displayed following Trump’s election (“we actually elected a
meme as president!” was one of the most publicized reactions [Ohlheiser 2016]) and
which resonates with the alt-right’s adoption of the codes of early trolling subculture.
It is however crucial to keep in mind the primordial difference between the trolling
culture analyzed by Whitney Philips and the trolls of the alt-right: Philips’ participant
trolls  are  not  only wary of  political  or  ideological  motivations,  they are  “agents  of
cultural digestion” in that they reveal implicit tropes of mainstream culture, whereas
ideologically-motivated  far-right  trolls  merely  exploit  trolling  culture,  memes,  and
strategies,  and  function  as  agents  of  cultural  dissemination,  attempting  to  act  as
trendsetters while at the same time running parallel to dominant conservative media
and discourses. 
34 The unique success of  the alt-right,  compared to previous iterations of  far-right or
white  supremacist  thought,  raises  the  question  of  what  is  really  distinct  about  its
mechanisms. Elements of response can be found in Phillips and Milner’s The Ambivalent
Internet, which stresses the fact that most phenomena perceived as original because of
their  online  context  are  only  the  extensions  of  already  existing  traditions:  “the
affordances  of  digital  media”  thus  simply  add  “new  dynamics  to  long-established
practices.” (Phillips & Milner 2017:  46) What is  worrying is  therefore not that such
supremacist, racialist, or antisemitic ideas still exist, but rather the ease with which
they  spread  and  the  number  of  people  reached.  This  leads  to  the  question  of  the
responsibility  of  mainstream media  and major  tech firms,  the  algorithms of  which
create numerous possibilities for self-radicalization, whether by functioning as echo-
chambers or by pushing users to go further “down the rabbit hole,” video after video,
meme after meme.16 
35 The  successful  use  of  memes  and  of  broader  internet  culture  also  provides
opportunities  to  reflect  on  the  state  of  contemporary  public  discourse  in  the  US,
notably  on  the  apparently  irreconcilable  paradox  consisting  in  a  sizeable  public
distrust for traditional journalistic outlets and mass media17 coupled to an increasing
number  of  people  taking  on  blind  faith  dubious  alternative  sources  such  as  the
notoriously  conspiratorial  website  Infowars  (for  all  its  rejections  of  the  evils  of
postmodernism, the alt-right displays a very postmodern contempt for notions such as
objectivity  or  even  truth),  or  the  deeply  and  explicitly  sensationalist  and  biased
Breitbart and Fox News. However, the same kind of sensationalist treatment of news, in
particular on topics related to the alt-right, can also be deplored on moderate or left-
leaning media, and may sometimes be equally damaging. Indeed, it has been suggested
that  the  success  of  the  alt-right  was  in  large  part  due  to  the  mainstream  media
conjuring it as a sort of ideological monster (Phillips 2016), through a vicious circle
consisting  on  the  one  hand  of  provocative  trolls  making  the  most  outrageous
statements, and on the other of corporate media publishing those statements either
because  it  will  appeal  to  their  radically  conservative  audiences,  or  to  elicit  the
indignation of progressives, in both cases garnering profitable attention and clicks, all
the parties involved thus exploiting the cultural tensions of contemporary America for
their own benefit. Once again, such issues are ones of amplification, and are all the
more relevant when considering the recent wave of domestic far-right terrorism in the
US,  and  the  influential  role  of  the  terrorists’  manifestos  successfully  incentivizing
potential successors. This essay thus attempted to shed new light on the possibilities
but also dangers of a strategic and targeted use of memes and internet culture, while
also  opening  new perspectives  which  demand attention,  notably  reflections  on  the
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deeper structural roots of white supremacism in the American past and present,  of
which the alt-right might only be the most conspicuous symptom.
36 One might also wish to be cautious with one particular frame of  reference used to
describe and analyze the alt-right which has indeed been repeatedly presented as a
counterculture  by  both  news  media  (Bernstein  2015b) and  scholars  (Nagle’s  Kill  All
Normies;  Khan 2019),  implying that  the subversive  and humorous style  used by the
movement,  and  its  attacks  against  taboos  of  the  contemporary  United  States,  are
enough to qualify it as a counterculture in the vein of that of the 1960s. I believe such
framing is misguided for two major reasons. First,  because of the fact that alt-right
ideology stems directly from centuries of traditional Western supremacist thought, in
particular on race and gender, as shown in this essay. The alt-right does not strive for a
new world and society; on the contrary: it yearns for a return to former norms and
hierarchies. Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the alt-right can hardly be considered a
cultural phenomenon per se, because it merely co-opts and weaponizes elements of
existing  subcultures  into  political  tools  and  tactics  suited  to  their  fundamentally
ideological motivations, whereas the Beats and hippies of the mid-century, or arguably
even the punk movement, were characterized by their original and abundant artistic
production. Only when one focuses strictly on aesthetics and form, can one interpret
the alt-right’s adoption of transgressive humor as displaying countercultural features,
which results in Nagle’s suggestion “to lay the very recent and very modern aesthetic
values of counterculture and the entire paradigm to rest and create something new.”
(Nagle 2017: 116) Although I agree that transgression for transgression’s sake can be
counter-productive, I would be equally cautious with such a prescriptive argument: the
use  of  an  ironic,  subversive,  and/or  humorous  style  should  not  be  renounced  by
progressive and radical dissidents solely because it was successfully exploited by white
nationalists.  The  unique  success  and  popularity  of  the  alt-right  is  largely  rooted
precisely  in  its  appeal  as  a  rebellious,  defiant  and  contrarian  movement,  a
representation manufactured once again both by the movement’s proponents and by
mainstream media. To give up the tradition and the field of humor and transgression,
in addition to large parts of internet culture and “postmodern folklore” to the alt-right
and  other  reactionary  groups  might  only  provide  a  self-fulfilling  quality  to  the
recurring memetic mantra of the larger radical right, that “the Left can’t meme,” and
drive more angry and confused youths into dangerously antagonistic mindsets.
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Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999)
Star Wars (George Lucas, 1977-2019)
The Lord of the Rings (Peter Jackson, 2001-3)
The Matrix (The Wachowskis, 1999)
NOTES
1. Named after a female game developer was harassed for having developed a game designed to
fight  against  depression,  a  ‘liberal’-minded  topic  in  a  milieu  usually  dominated  by  games
glorifying  physical  violence.  See  also  below,  section  ‘Online  culture  wars  and  ideological
antagonists.’
2. For more on anti-feminism, misogyny and the manosphere, see Donna Zuckerberg’s Not All
Dead  White  Men:  Classics  and  Misogyny  in  the  Digital  Age (2018).  For  the  links  between  the
manosphere and the alt-right, see Romano (2016/8).
3. Some groups or individuals are sometimes referred to as alt-lite, which is said to reject the
white nationalist designation and focus on culture rather than on racial questions, but for the
sake of clarity I will only use the alt-right designation in this essay, although I am aware that its
use is controversial in itself.
4. This myth has been debunked on several occasions, with one exhaustive example to be found
here: https://twosixteenhouse.wordpress.com/2017/03/04/the-myth-of-the-swedish-rapefugee/
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5. “Serbia Strong/Remove Kebab.” Know Your Meme,  June 21,  2010 (updated March 28,  2019).
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/serbia-strong-remove-kebab
6. “Orcposting.” Know Your Meme, May 31, 2017. https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/orcposting
7. “Social Justice Warrior.” Know Your Meme, February 19, 2015 (updated April 9, 2018). https://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/social-justice-warrior 
8. See the various definitions of Social Justice Warrior, in large part hostile, on “Social Justice
Warrior,”  Urban  Dictionary.  https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?
term=Social%20Justice%20Warrior
9. It  is  hardly  coincidental  that  most  SJW  internet  memes  present  female  subjects  almost
systematically as overly emotional and by extension irrational.  Philips (2015) and Zuckerberg
(2017) both underline how the prevalence of reason over emotion is a logical extension of the
androcentrism of the Western tradition of philosophy.
10. “NPC  Wojack.”  Know  Your  Meme,  September  17,  2018  (updated  April  4,  2019).  https://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/npc-wojak 
11. “Wojack/Feels  Guy.”  Know  Your  Meme,  July  9,  2015  (updated  January  7,  2018).  https://
knowyourmeme.com/memes/wojak-feels-guy
12. Source:  http://www.trumptwitterarchive.com/archive/
fake%20news%20%7C%7C%20fakenews%20%7C%7C%20fake%20media/ttff/1-19-2017_
13. According to the Anti-Defamantion League, “Right-wing extremists collectively have been
responsible  for  more  than  70  percent  of  the  427  extremist-related  killings  over  the  past  10
years.” (Greenblatt 2019) 
14. Following the 2012 shooting of Trayvon Martin, Roof explains that he searched for “black on
white crime” and picked the website of the Council of Conservative Citizens, a white supremacist
group created in 1985.
15. David Neiwert  for  example makes this  connection (Neiwert  2017:  258),  while  J.M.  Berger
(2016) provides an interesting comparative study between alt-right and ISIS online social media
networks, with a focus on their respective (and similar) uses of Twitter.
16. For a recent large-scale quantitative study of radicalization on YouTube from “alt-lite” or
“Intellectual Dark Web” channels to more radical alt-right ones, see Ribeiro et al. (2019).
17. According to Gallup, in 2019 only 41% of Americans expressed some trust in mass media, a
proportion  which  sinks  at  15%  among  Republicans.  https://news.gallup.com/poll/267047/
americans-trust-mass-media-edges-down.aspx 
ABSTRACTS
In this essay, I discuss how the alt-right has brought back into fashion traditional tenets of the
reactionary, xenophobic, and often racist far-right, as demonstrated by George Hawley, and how
it  has  managed to  make  these  tenets  appear  as  novel,  provocative,  and  updated  to  the  21st
century U.S. society and digital environment. I argue that to do so, alt-righters relied heavily on
the  creation,  and  sometimes  reappropriation,  of  enemy  images,  with  the  ultimate  goals  of
provoking outrage, instilling fear and/or hatred towards specific groups, reinforcing a sense of
belonging within their own community,  or more broadly manipulating collective perceptions
and representations,  first  online then in real  life.  Indeed,  the election of  Donald Trump was
hailed by the online alt-right as one of their major successes. With the help of irony, subversion,
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and often carefully engineered propaganda-like messages and images,  the alt-right,  it  boasts,
“meme’d into office” the Republican candidate. This paper consequently leads to an analysis of
real-life repercussions of such adversarial rhetoric, notably through examples of recent far-right
domestic terrorism in the US, and to a reflection on their place in an age of post-truth, fake news,
and alternative facts. This contribution focuses on several enemy images. The first is that of the
civilizational enemy from the outside, which uses the traditional process of othering. This theme
is linked to Trump’s campaign and to his attacks against two major “enemies” of the U.S., namely
Hispanics and Muslims. With the alt-right,  refugees for example become “rapefugees,” which
easily  appeals  to  rampant  islamophobia.  The  second  enemy  image  created  by  the  alt-right
consists  in  its  ideological  opponents.  Here,  the  function  of  the  enemy  image  is  to  discredit
opponents  and  their  views  (“cuckservative,”  “feminazi,”  or  the  sarcastic  “Social  Justice
Warrior”).  The third enemy image establishes a link between the first  two. It  depicts what I
would call  the “enemy within,”  a  common thread (or  threat)  in  far-right  ideologies.  Indeed,
cultural Marxism, a widespread conspiracy theory among the alt-right, is what its proponents
believe to be the hidden reason for the perceived decline of the Western civilization. According
to this worldview, the ideological opponents push a conspiracy against the West and its values.
The  recurring  claims  of  a  liberal  bias  among  the  media  and  academia  also  belong  to  this
conspiracy theory. It also embraces elements of anti-Semitism, as well as traditional aspects of
anti-communism,  reminiscent  of  the  historical  Red  Scares.  Such  a  theory  thus  provides  its
believers  with  a  broader  narrative,  as  well  as  with  a  common  enemy  to  rally  against,  and
therefore builds a form of intersectionality among various online fringe groups. 
Dans cet article, je traite de la façon dont l’alt-right a su remettre au goût du jour des doctrines
traditionnelles de l’extrême-droite réactionnaire, xénophobe, et bien souvent raciste, comme a
pu le démontrer George Hawley, ainsi que la manière dont ces principes ont été présentés comme
nouveaux, provocateurs, et réactualisés à l’aune de la société américaine et de l’environnement
digital  contemporains.  Pour  ce  faire,  j’affirme  que  les  membres  de  l’alt-right  ont  largement
compté sur  la  création,  et  parfois  la  réappropriation d’images  ennemies,  avec  pour  objectifs
ultimes de provoquer l’indignation, d’instiller peur et/ou haine de certains groupes spécifiques,
de renforcer le sentiment d’appartenance dans leur propre communauté, ou plus largement de
manipuler les perceptions et représentations collectives, d’abord en ligne, puis dans la réalité.
L’élection de Donald Trump a été saluée par l’alt-right comme l’un de ses principaux succès. A
l’aide d’ironie, de subversion, et d’images et messages souvent méticuleusement construits, l’alt-
right se vante d’avoir fait élire le candidat républicain grâce aux mèmes, l’arme de prédilection
dans les guerres culturelles en ligne. Cet article analyse les répercussions dans le monde réel de
telles  pratiques  rhétoriques  antagonistes,  notablement  à  travers  des  exemples  récents  de
terrorisme domestique d’extrême-droite aux Etats-Unis, et à une réflexion sur leur place dans
une ère souvent qualifiée de post-vérité, faite de « fake news » et de faits alternatifs. Cet article
s’intéresse  alors  plusieurs  images ennemies.  La  première est  celle  de l’ennemi civilisationnel
venu de l’extérieur, qui repose sur l’usage de processus traditionnels d’altérité. Ce thème est lié à
la  campagne  de  Trump  et  à  ses  attaques  contre  deux  ennemis  majeurs  des  Etats-Unis,  les
hispaniques et les musulmans. Avec l’alt-right, les refugiés deviennent ainsi des « rapefugees »
(i.e.  des  violeurs  déguisés  en  réfugiés),  une  formulation  destinée  à  attiser  une  islamophobie
grandissante en Amérique et en Europe. La deuxième image ennemie créée par l’alt-right est
constituée de ses ennemis idéologiques. La fonction de cette image ennemie est de discréditer les
opposants  idéologiques  et  leurs  vues  (avec  des  mots-valises  tels  que  « cuckservative »,
« feminazi », ou le sarcastique « Social Justice Warrior ».) La troisième image ennemie établit un
lien  entre  les  deux  premières.  Elle  dépeint  ce  que  j’appellerais  l’ennemi  de  l’intérieur,  une
menace récurrente aux idéologies d’extrême-droite. En effet, le marxisme culturel, une théorie
du  complot  répandue  dans  les  cercles  de  l’alt-right,  serait  la  force  se  cachant  derrière  le
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« déclin »  de  la  civilisation  occidentale.  D’après  cette  vision  du  monde,  les  antagonistes
idéologiques  participant  à  un  complot  délibéré  contre  l’Ouest  et  ses  valeurs.  Les  attaques
récurrentes contre un supposé biais  « gauchiste » des médias et  du monde universitaire font
partie de cette théorie conspirationniste, et ont contribué à sa diffusion. Elle épouse également
des éléments d’antisémitisme, ainsi que des vues anti-communistes traditionnelles, qui ne sont
pas sans rappeler les Peurs rouges historiques. Une telle théorie fournit donc à ses partisans un
récit  bien établi  censé démystifier la  complexité du monde,  ainsi  que des ennemis communs
contre  lesquels  se  rallier,  et  construit  ainsi  une  forme  d’intersectionnalité  entre  différents
groupes marginaux présents en ligne.
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